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  21. Introduction 
 
Eastern border management policy was a reaction of the Polish State to the new historical 
circumstances it was exposed to after 1989. Before that date, Poland’s migration policy, of 
which border policy is a part, used to be rather focused on emigration and Western border. 
The communist Poland had a long tradition of various political decisions shaping the outflow 
of its own citizens, but after 1989 the focus was changed not only because of 
democratization, but also by the influx of migrants, either seeking employment in Poland or 
traveling further West. 
Initially Polish authorities treated foreigners as one of the side-effect of the transformation.
1 
However, they did not account for the global dimension of the phenomenon. Poland entered 
the regional migratory system in the early 1990s, which were the period of a refugee crisis in 
Europe
2. Soon it became obvious that the initial small inflow of asylum seekers returned from 
Sweden was not an isolated case, also Germany started readmissions procedures. The CEE 
countries were required to accept the shift of the asylum inflows to their territories, taking in a 
relatively small portion of the applicants. They were also charged with the new mission of 
Gatekeeping, i.e. keeping the dangerous exterior in a distance from the safe European 
interior. Their readiness to access was connected discursively with the feeling of security of 
the EU societies. Candidate countries had to “reassure populations in Europe that gaps were 
being filled in the fight against crime.”
3 Development of this domain of migration policy was 
perceived as sine qua non of Poland’s credibility on the international scene, what of course 
reflected the need to comply with Copenhagen criteria. Additionally, readmission agreements 
were usually followed by financial support to Polish governmental agencies, since Western 
European states provided technical and financial aid to assist Poland with this new 
responsibility. 
The pressures from the Western European countries, fearing so called “permeable Eastern 
borders” impacted the 17 years of Polish migration policy development. It became focused 
mainly on the border management issues, ignoring such questions as labor migration or 
integration. Related to this was the special interest in asylum policy, as undocumented 
migrants crossing the borders usually sought humanitarian protection when apprehended.  
The development of immigration policy in Poland has been always treated as an expression 
of the coercive nature of the Associated, and later of the Candidate State’s relations with the 
EU. Main issues raised from this perspective are the imposed asylum policy that transformed 
Poland into a buffer zone of the Schengen area, or the reluctance with which Polish 
government introduced visa policy towards Ukraine and Belarus. One aspect of these 
changes however is missing – the possibility of actual modification of the system of beliefs. 
The fact that a restrictive policy versus foreigners emerged in the country of very low 
immigration levels, only slightly exceeding 0.1% of total population, cannot be explained by 
domestic processes (Zolberg 1978, Holliefield 1992, Kubat 1993, Puchala 1997). This policy, 
virtually inexistent in Poland prior to 1990, was created by subsequent Polish governments 
from nothing, in the process of policy learning. The models were the Western European 
countries, and the sheer fact of introducing Poland into the European migration policy making 
                                                 
1 Szonert, (2000) describes in detail the first year of the immigration crisis. in “Rok 1990 – Początki Opieki nad 
Uchodźcami”. In: Jan E. Zamojski, Migracje  Polityczne XX Wieku pp. 35-64. 
2 In the years 1991-1993 the numbers of applications hit the ceiling in many Western European countries. E.g. 
Germany received 438.200 applications in 1992 (cfr. 193.100 in 1990 and 127.200 in 1994); Italy – 31.700 in 
1991 (cfr. 4.700 in 1990 and 2.600 in 1992); Sweden – 84.000 in 1992 (cfr. 27.400 in 1991 and 18.600 in 1994); 
UK – 44.800 in 1991 (cfr. 26.200 in 1990 and 24.600 in 1992). Papademetriou, D. (1996). Coming together or 
falling apart? The European Union’s Struggle with Immigration and Asylum. Washington: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, p.70. 
3 European JHS Commissioner A. Vitorino cited in Enlargement Weekly Newsletter, 19th March, 2002.  
  3system (i.e. COE, Budapest Group, Vienna Group) also shaped the newborn policy. It was 
not discussed by the media, society or politicians, it was mainly created by technocrats 
without consultation, and yet – it was widely accepted.  
It is thus beyond any discussion that there were circumstance favoring Europeanization of 
Polish border management policy, mostly through the influence of individual member states, 
and on the European level in the whole pre-accession period (Weinar 2003, Weinar 2006, 
Górny et al. 2007). 
However, it is not clear what degree of Europeanization we have witnessed, since it differs 
depending on the policy section we are looking at. The future border policy seem to be 
doomed to Europeanize the deepest as Poland enters Schengen area, but is it really the 
case? 
In this paper I want to examine the prospects of Europeanization of the migration policy, and 
especially the border policy beyond accession. I argue that Eastern border policy in Poland 
will not be thoroughly Europeanized since the situation before and after Enlargement is 
different. Firstly, I will discuss the concept of Europeanization from the perspective of a 
former accession country. I will show how it differs from Europeanization discussed in 
relation to old EU-15. Then I will present the state of border management in Poland, 
especially in relation to its security agenda. In the end I will focus on the present situation of 
policy making through the lenses of Europeanization. 
The paper used both desk research methods and empirical studies conducted in 2003 and 
2006.
4 It takes into account the debates of the subsequent Alien Bills, where the strategies of 
the actors and the argumentation were studied. Moreover, the analysis uses the in-depth 
interview data gathered in Poland among the policy makers, secondary statistical sources 
and documentary data on Polish immigration policy developments. 
 
  
2. Europeanization  of  migration policy in Poland 
 
Discussion of Europeanization of migration policy in Poland requires presentation of 
the main assumptions the study relies on. The most important claim is that we can discuss 
Europeanization in the context broader than EU membership (Kazan/Weaver 1994, Agh 
1997, Grabbe 2001). It was especially clear in the case of accession countries, which 
experienced a strong Europeanization in the policy fields under negotiations. Sometimes, as 
in the case of JHA chapter, they became more Europeanized than the member states 
themselves (Grabbe 2003, Weinar 2006).  
Another assumption is that Europeanization is the set of processes of construction and 
institutionalization of formal and informal rules of doing politics, of shared systems of beliefs 
(cfr. Radaelli 2000:4), thus it goes beyond a mere harmonization of law. Moreover, 
Europeanization of policy in the case of CEE countries before accession was both direct 
(vertical), through the coercive relations with European institutions, and indirect (horizontal), 
through the convergence of policy, modeled on the EU member states. Finally, the most 
important feature of Europeanization when discussing CEE countries is the fact, that the 
changes have been actor-driven, strongly linked to the processes of policy learning and 
socialization (Checkel, 2001).  
 
                                                 
4 The paper is based on my earlier work on Europeanization of Polish migration policy in the framework of my 
PhD project (Weinar, 2006) and the Challenge research project (www.libertysecurity.org). 
  42.1  Europeanization studies and the Polish case 
 
Europeanization, in its political science theoretical background, has not been a major 
scientific approach used to analyze Poland’s European integration and its social or 
institutional consequences. 
Having said that, we have to acknowledge the attempts to actually use the Europeanization 
framework in the analysis of the Polish migration policy development (Weinar 2003, Weinar 
2006, Górny et al. 2007). The works used the analytical approach of policy learning and 
socialization, focusing on the role of actors in the process. All authors supported the thesis 
that the Europeanization started already in the early 1990s as a consequence of interactions 
interactions between Polish and European policy-makers, Polish and international 
institutions. The main channel of Europeanization though, facilitating the policy learning and 
policy transfer, was the accession negotiation process, with the leading role of the European 
Commission and EU conditionality mechanisms.  
Górny et al. (2007) undertook also the measurement of the degrees of Europeanization in 
various migration policy subfields. It was shown that this particular policy is “advanced yet 
uneven” depending on the policy subfield. Asylum policy, created according to Western 
experiences and the developed EU acquis in the field, was claimed to be most Europeanized 
(transformation) whereas the visa policy was presented as more domestically shaped 
(absorption).  
I took more discursive approach elsewhere (Weinar 2006). The proposed analysis of the 
migration policy-making process with the focus on legislative process showed that the 
concepts and the legitimizing strategies originating from Western European debate 
influenced the shape of migration policy in Poland. The Europeanization of political discourse 
in Poland was displayed through the juxtaposition of humanitarian and securitizing 
discourses that was transferred to Poland from Western Europe. The Europeanization of 
Polish migration policy was to a great extent dependant on the discursive turns. The 
restrictive policy, resulting in some serious expenses for the taxpayers, was rather unlikely to 
find support in the country were immigration was not perceived as a problem. Thus 
legitimization could only occur if the migration became an issue. This was achieved by linking 
migration policy to EU accession, modernization and securitization. While two first concepts 
were gradually undermined by Eurosceptics, securitization could not possibly be contested. It 
happened also by creating the feeling that the policy is needed, and it is needed as restrictive 
as it’s possible under the circumstances. The restrictiveness became identified with being 
modern and European. On the other hand, together with growing usage of security 
arguments, the liberalization of the policy took place – Aliens Act of 1997 was much less 
foreigner-friendly that the one of 2003. What happened was a transplantation of Europe-wide 
policy gap, with harsh discursive strategies borne by securitization, and humanitarian 
provisions accepting liberal values and human rights.  In this sense the Polish policy makers 
proved that they are truly European. 
The analysis allowed for building a model of migration policy in Poland. It is characterized by 
the discrepancies between external pressures and internal needs in policy development, and 
by the technocratic way of policy-making without the involvement of the public opinion 
(Weinar 2006: 19-20). The political elites were thus the central actors, policy entrepreneurs in 
the “top-down” policy-making model (Weinar 2006: 221-222).  
 
2.2 Europeanization  of  the Polish border policy  
 
If at the very beginning of the system transformation, it was possible to speak of the relatively 
‘soft’ attitude of the authorities concerning border crossings, towards the end of the 1990s 
  5and the beginning of the 2000s, we have encountered an intensification of activities 
concerning the legal and institutional elaboration of answers to various immigration-related 
issues. They were exemplified by  the new Aliens Act passed in September 1997
5, the 
amendment to this Act passed in 2001
6, and the new Aliens Act passed in May 2003
7. 
Administrative-legal regulations did not appear as a result of clear stated goals and long-term 
state plans but as fragmented activities under pressure of events in the country and 
influences from beyond its borders. That is why Poland was constrained to change so 
abruptly and often its immigration laws. Definitely, the problem of Polish immigration policy 
has been its dependency on the EU acquis regulations, and the obligation to keep pace with 
the requirements that have been “under construction”. They concerned asylum policy and 
border control, reflecting both the most institutionalized policy sectors on the European level 
and the fields of the greatest concern for the member states. 
The Europeanization of the border control started with the opening of the borders in 1989. 
The restricting regulations followed, stemming from the regional initiatives on migration, 
which influenced Polish migration policy development in the very beginning. Among them 
was participation in the Berlin Group, initiated in October 1991. The Group, formed by the 
Vienna Club and non-Vienna Club European Community member states, 13 Central and 
Eastern European countries, set forth the cooperation in the field of illegal immigration, 
borders control and re-entry agreements. The direct consequence of the Berlin Process was 
establishing of even closer cooperation under the Budapest Group, involving EC presidency, 
Schengen Group, EFTA, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. 
The Budapest Group members still cooperate in the field of illegal migration and trafficking. 
Thus started the process of socialization of the Polish policy makers in the milieu of officials 
who viewed migration mainly as a threat (Huysmans 2000). 
In the pre-accession decade, the ideas about migrations were definitely shaped by the 
European ideas of human rights on one hand, and by the migration control models existing in 
the Western European countries, on the other. Focusing on restricting the inflow by opening 
up the gate to send the immigrants back East from the Polish territory, the policy makers 
decided to copy the Western model and in 1996 they proposed the signing of the 
readmission agreements with Ukraine, Belarus and Russia.
8 Similar agreements were 
signed with other neighbors.  
The Act on Border Guards was adopted as early as 1990, creating thus the new uniformed 
formation responsible for the management of the borders. In the period of 1995 (first drafts of 
the Polish new aliens laws) and 2003 (the visa regime introduced), the process of 
construction of alien law in Poland went through three important stages. First stage, from 
1994 to 1997, was informed mainly by international policy learning, and ended with the 
Aliens Act of 1997
9 and the new Constitution, where the foreigners were granted the right to 
asylum and refugee status. The Act itself was surprisingly restrictive in spirit, providing for 
non-flexible measures concerning refugees and asylum seekers, and defining in a very 
narrow way the catalogue of premises on which a foreigner can be granted a temporary or 
permanent permit. The Act was eclectic, built from the parts of various alien laws taken from 
the laws of some European countries, which thus provided legislative and institutional 
templates. The Act established the first permits for foreigners and it defined asylum policy, 
bringing in the new concepts already present in the Western discourse on immigration, but 
completely new to the Polish political domain, as linking immigration with various threats or 
linking restrictiveness of the policy with its modernizing, or Europeanizing, character.  
                                                 
5 Aliens Act of June 25, 1997, Dziennik Ustaw, 1997, no 114, item739 
6 Amendment of the Aliens Act of April 11, 2001, Dziennik Ustaw, 2001, no 42, item 475 
7 Aliens Act of June 13, 2003 Dziennik Ustaw 2003, no 94, item 788; Act on Protection of Aliens on the Polish 
Territory of June 13, 2003, Dziennik Ustaw, 2003, no 94, item 788) 
8 Only Ukraine accepted the agreement. In case of Belarus, even if there is no readmission agreement, in practice 
the readmission is very smooth, on the basis of the Polish-Belarusian Border Treaty (I8). 
9 Aliens Act of June 25, 1997 (Dziennik Ustaw 114, item 739, 1997) 
  6In 1998-2001, Poland found itself in a new political situation.  Firstly, since it started its 
negotiations phase in the Chapter of JHA; secondly, that after the Amsterdam Treaty, the 
Schengen acquis was incorporated in the accession acquis, what meant broader scope of 
alien laws. In the screening procedure Poland adopted 180 legal acts in the JHA, out of 
which 160 was part of Schengen acquis. Hence, Poland needed an amendment to its Alien 
Act.
10 It was adopted in 2001 and it bore a much more accentuated element of liberal 
approach and human rights than the previous law. The most important change here was the 
introduction of family reunification, mainly for refugees. Poland was now more dependable on 
EU for any further autonomous decisions, since new mechanisms were introduced to monitor 
Polish developments in this area: the gate-keeping, i.e. guarding access to negotiations and 
further stages in the accession process, as well as advice and twinning.  
In the last period before introduction of the visas, Polish decision makers prepared new acts - 
Aliens Act of 2003 and Aliens Protection Act of 2003.
11 They divided thus the law more 
humanitarian in scope, concerning refugee status and asylum from the alien law, definitely 
more restrictive. The visa regime can be mentioned here as an example. In that period, the 
incorporated laws were following strictly the EU conditionality, and there was a very limited 
margin of any national choices. The conditional closure of negotiations in the chapter 24th 
provided for constant benchmarking and monitoring of the progress Poland would make on 
the way to Schengen standards. 
To sum up briefly – the foreigners protection policy, and especially refugee policy, was 
systematically made less restrictive, with the Act of 2003 providing for the most humanitarian 
solutions; the policy concerning foreigners in general was changing in the opposite direction, 
from quite flexible (no provisions at all) to more institutionalized and regulated approach. 
These changes were accompanied by the changes in discourse. All the provisions were 
justified by two main argumentative patterns: modernization and securitization (Weinar 
2006). These two strategies were often interrelated, as the Western Europe, i.e. what Poland 
would like to become (modernization) would be showed as an example of negative 
consequences of migration (securitization). These two discourses practically hushed any 
debate on the proposed solutions. Until the visa regime was proposed. 
The prospect of Poland’s accession to the EU meant that it was necessary to change the 
regulations for the citizens of Eastern states traveling to Poland. The need to introduce visas 
has, for a number of years, been one of the major issues in our relations with the Eastern 
countries; on the one hand, our Eastern neighbors feared hindrance to our mutual contacts 
and the emergence of a new ‘iron’ or ‘paper’ curtain; on the other, Euroskeptics kept telling 
the public that Poland and Europe, by introducing visas, will turn their back on our Eastern 
neighbors. The policy has been focused on the objectives quite contrary to the common 
understanding of the role the visas play in the regulation of migration flows. he visa policy 
has been seen as externally imposed tool related to the EU conditionality, not in tune with the 
Polish tradition nor Polish national interest. The presence of the social, economic, cultural 
and historical ties with Ukraine, which per se led to quite significant immigration flows to 
Poland, have been seen as enriching phenomenon rather than security concern. The 
negotiation between the two standpoints led to a particular mixture: strict policy regulations 
and lax implementation. The rationale behind this policy created outcomes quite different 
from the usually expected. 
Initially, Poland made attempts (particularly in its relations with Ukraine) to find an alternative 
to visas. Finally, however, the government unequivocally declared readiness to fully 
harmonize these regulations with the Schengen standards. Aware of the benefits: the 
prospect of abolition of border control between Poland and Germany and that of cooperation 
in the field of security with other EU states, Poland was also conscious of the dangers. That 
                                                 
10 Act amending the Aliens Act and some other acts of 11 April 2001, Dziennik Ustaw, No 42, item 475. 
11 Aliens Act of 13 June 2003 (Dziennik Ustaw No.94, item 787); Act on Protection of Aliens on the Territory of 
the Republic of Poland of 13 June 2003 (Dziennik Ustaw No.94, item 788) 
  7is why the preparations to introduce visas were accompanied by the will (enjoying wide 
popular support) to introduce solutions which would minimize inconveniences connected with 
applying for a visa and prevent the emergence of a barrier to our contacts with the Eastern 
neighbors. 
Securitization of visa policy was thus impossible at that stage since it was not a political 
issue; on the contrary, this decision was extremely unpopular in the public discourse. No 
force on the domestic forum could support a securitizing move – such a move would be 
dangerous for political integrity of securitizing actor. Instead, security discourse on visas was 
performed on supranational level, as a form of strategic socialization. On the domestic level, 
visas were legitimized by the discourse of the EU conditionality and the question was virtually 
omitted in securitizing discourse, with the exception of the official presentation of the policy 
provisions in the parliament.
12  
Polish visa regime offers ca. 23 types of various visas, and such diversification gives a wide 
range of options for the consulates to run user-friendly policy. Moreover, Poland negotiated 
fee-free movement from Ukraine (in exchange for no-visa for Polish citizens). Russia and 
Belarus rejected such an offer – the citizens of these countries have to pay 10 EUR for one-
entry visa, 16 EUR for double entry visa, and 50 EUR for multiple entry visa. However, in 
many cases the fee is waived or reduced. The details are provided in the bilateral 
agreements between Poland and the three countries. 
In Belarus, entry visas are granted free of charge to people under 16 and over  65; to people 
visiting graveyards in Poland (twice a year); to participants of scientific, educational, cultural, 
technical, or sport events on international, interregional and interdepartmental level; to 
academics, scholars, or students participating in exchange programs; to investigation or 
court officers; to disabled persons and their assistants; and to the members of Euroregions 
"Niemen", "Bug", and "Puszcza Białowieska". Multiple entry visas at 50% discount are 
granted to individuals visiting close relatives. 
In Russia, no fee entry visas are issued to individuals under 16 and over 70; to disabled 
persons; to individuals visiting the graveyards (twice a year); to individuals visiting sick family 
members or entering to attend a funeral; to participants of scientific, educational, cultural, 
technical, sport events; to exchange academic teachers and exchange students; to railways 
employees while working; and to inhabitants of the Kaliningrad District. 
In Ukraine, where the visas are still free of charge, the main objective is to facilitate the 
frequency of movement. And thus the multiple entry visas are issued to railway employees 
while at work; to international truck drivers; to exchange participants on different government 
levels; to participants of bilateral programs in any important spheres of collaboration; to the 
owners of real estate in Poland or inheritors of such; to people visiting graveyards; to people 
visiting families; and to the retirees. 
As it can be easily guessed from the catalogue, these facilitations are aimed mainly at 
fostering the human dimension of the border crossings: family ties, business networks, 
institutional collaboration.  
The reform of the consulates was also needed in view of several hundred thousand visas to 
be issued annually. The consulate with the highest volume, Lvov, which issues over 1000 
visas daily, introduced internet procedure to facilitate and to speed up the process. 
 
TAB. 1 Consulates issuing the largest number of visas in 2004 
Lvov     217.935     Brest  102.494    
Lutsk  178.046     Grodno  84.304    
                                                 
12 E.g. Sejm, seating no 49, 20 May 2003. 
  8Kiev     148.233     Moscow  49.083    
Kaliningrad   136.736     Kishinev  18.350    
Minsk  105.667       Odessa  18.292  
Source: Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
The measures seem to work and the volume of crossings, after the drastic drop in 
incoming movement from the three countries that occurred in the period following September 
30, 2003 seem to have returned to the previous size. 
 
FIG. 1 Border crossings on the borders with Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, 01.02-12.04 
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Nevertheless, the visa regime has redefined Polish geographical position. As it can be 
concluded from the table below, the contacts with Poland’s Western and Southern neighbors 
have been more intensive. The EU accession played a crucial role here, not only promoting 
Polish business opportunities, but also Polish products and tourist attractions. Thus the 
purpose of the visit declared by the foreigners coming from these directions was mainly 
business and tourism. 
 
TAB. 2 January-June 2004 Incoming Foreigners Changes in relation to 2003 in the same 
period 
 
Total 27180,221,0  % 
EASTERN BORDER  4729,3  -10,5% 
Russian Federation  287,9  -5,0% 
  9Lithuania 659,8  8,1% 
Belarus 1845,0  -2,7% 
Ukraine 1936,61 -14,3% 
SOUTHERN BORDER  7336,0  25,0% 
Slovakia 1458,7  100,1% 
Czech Republic  5877,2  14,3% 
WESTERN BORDER  13990,6  37,4% 
Sea border   477,3  -17,7% 
Airports 647,0  19,4% 
Source: Polish Chamber of Tourism 
The crossings from the East definitely dropped, but they are nonetheless expected to rise in 
2006 statistical report.  
Polish visa regime, with individual-oriented ideology of implementation, has not generated 
the phenomena present in other CEE states introducing acquis Schengen. These include 
permanent drop in legal cross-border movements and increase of citizenship applications 
from the members of the minority abroad, as it was the case of Hungary and is the case of 
Bulgaria.  
It might be stated that Polish visa policy, through its flexibility and user friendly mechanisms 
in fact limited a possible inflow of migrants looking for “extra-legal” way of entry. Of course, 
we cannot rule out the rise in unregistered migration, but as for now the numbers reported by 
the Border Guards do no seem much changed. 
 
TAB. 3 Foreigners apprehended for illegal border crossings. 
Year  1998 2000 2002 2004 2006  (Jan-Sept) 
direction From 
Poland 
To 
Poland 
From 
Poland 
To 
Poland 
From 
Poland 
To 
Poland 
From 
Poland 
To 
Poland 
From 
Poland 
To 
Poland 
Totals  2,339 1,868 2,295 1,771 1,739 1,512 3,124 1,608 1,060  1,225 
Source: Border Guards statistical reports. 
Therefore, given the overall developments in the field and the uneven degree of its 
Europeanization, can we expect further changes leading to more Europeanized border policy 
and politics? 
 
3.    The future of border management in Poland  
 
The border policy related to migration depends to a large extent on three factors: 
institutions shaping it, the security agenda behind it and the actual implementation.  
As a consequence of the historical processes described above, the Polish borders are 
managed by several institutions using several legal acts. As it has been said, the 
management is free from the public opinion pressures.  
The governmental body truly interested in borders per se is of course the ministry of 
Defense. However, in the context of border policy as a part of migration policy, it has a 
limited say. On the other hand, the Ministry of Interior and Administration has within its 
structures three official bodies that are responsible for the migration-related border policy: the 
  10Border Guards, the Police, the Office for Repatriation and Aliens. The Office has been 
responsible for legislative proposals concerning the border, most recently it has prepared the 
amendment of the Aliens Act of 2005, transponing 6 EU directives in the field of migration 
policy. The Police holds prerogatives concerning checking documents and arresting 
undocumented aliens. It is the Border Guards who actually implement the policy on the 
borders. The role of Parliament is limited to discussing the legislative proposals and adopting 
them, usually without putting a fight. Another potentially important player might be Frontex, 
after Poland’s accession to Schengen, and provided that the agency grows in strength, both 
budget- and operationally-wise. 
Polish Border Guards are thus the main recipient and executor of the border policy related to 
migration. The formation, created with the Act on Border Guards in 1990 has been 
operational since 1991. As far as the Eastern border, it is responsible for 1,186 km of it, out 
of which 535 km with Ukraine, 418 km with Belarus and 232 with Russia. The unit employs 
over 15,000 operational employees, but the presence on the Western border has been 
reduced by 50% and is supposed to disappear upon the Schengen accession, meaning that 
Eastern border will receive the influx of additional officers. The Polish Border Guards are 
considered to be one of the best organized formation of this type in Europe. It is important 
that it is an autonomous unit, with its own annual budget, what of course provides a wide 
margin of independence. The Border Guards as a executing organ, has an active role in 
consultations of the legislative proposals. However, the most important is its capability of 
introducing pilot studies, joint programs and other experiments improving the cross-border 
cooperation. 
To understand the future developments of the border policy in Poland we have to highlight 
Polish security policy. Polish defense and security agenda is neither long nor complicated. 
The key tenets of our security are based on Poland’s membership in NATO, including 
participation in missions and developing Polish army according to NATO standards. NATO, 
however, is associated mainly with the US and Poland has been focusing on  bilateral 
politico-military co-operation with the US as its second tenet of security agenda. Polish 
presence in Afghanistan and, most notably, in Iraq stems from these two points. 
Unfortunately, for the time being, Poland has been only giving concessions to the US 
demands without getting much in exchange. The lure of economic gains in the war in Iraq 
has been deluded, and the construction of some parts of the US anti-missile shield on the 
Polish territory was not truly negotiated by the Polish government. Somehow, for the 
politicians leading Poland now, into Schengen and as far as into its 5
th year in the EU, the US 
relations are the top priority. 
The European Union, on the other hand, is apparently not seen as important partner in the 
security agenda. Of course, Polish governments multiple times stressed their commitment to 
further develop effective European Security and Defense Policy, but the actual innovation n 
this field is rather limited. Firstly, the plans for the anti-missile shield overlook NATO, and 
thus several important European players. Poland did not happen to promote the shield as 
European/NATO security tool.  The Polish proposal of the European Union army (in 
November 2006), under the command of the President of the European Commission was 
surrealistic, it ignored the basics of the European institutional system. What is actually 
important is that the current Polish government and administration actually ignores European 
dimension and lacks the know-how to foster its interests on this level. 
Another important point on the security agenda are good relations with all seven neighbors of 
Poland: Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Sweden, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. This is 
the statement of the most important consequences for the border policy, because it implies, 
among others, transborder cooperation. If the first four cases are pretty clear in terms of the 
border, as the EU member states, the last three cause quite a political confusion.  
The majority of undocumented crossings, or their attempts, happens on the Western border 
of Poland, from Poland to Germany. Polish-German cross-border cooperation set an 
  11example to follow also on other borders. It includes joint patrols and information exchange 
outside of the Schengen system. The working readmission agreements lead almost always 
to unproblematic deportations to Poland. Actually, undocumented migrant apprehended by a 
joint Polish-German patrol is noted as apprehended on the Polish territory. Polish citizens are 
often let into Poland by a German police officer and vice versa. This cooperation is built on 
reciprocity and trust, elaborated over nearly 17 years of leading joint actions and mutual 
exchange. Since Germany was Poland’s main ally in the development of the migration policy 
and its main teacher, the trust on the Western border has developed, what is quite 
remarkable given the history of wars and territorial claims between the two countries – only in 
1990 Germany did recognize the border on Oder.  
Similar comprehensive cooperation is now being developed with Slovak and Czech border 
guards – but the Southern border of Poland is the true pre-Schengen trial. 
Ukraine, especially after its Orange Revolution, earned a credit of friendship and support 
among Polish elites of all options. Thus this is the country that really dominates the visa 
debate. Poland is the only country trying to develop the same level of cooperation with 
Ukraine as it has developed on the German border. One was the program ARGO, an attempt 
to form joint patrols, what for the time being is very difficult, given the problems with 
information flows (level of access to information on both sides). Polish officers provide 
training for Ukrainian ones, trying to reach out to them. However, the mutual relations on the 
local level are not rosy. There are problems with having readmission agreement fulfilled and 
in general the cooperation in apprehension is difficult. Therefore, the patches of the border 
with Ukraine are perceived as porous. 
On the other side of the spectrum, Belarus has been perceived as a dark corner of Europe, 
and the border with Poland is presented to be the only light in the tunnel for the active but 
weak opposition. Therefore the policy on this piece of the border has different implications, 
the discourse is focused on human rights and democracy. Interestingly enough, just because 
the neighbor on the other side is not democratic, the border is easier to control. Very few 
undocumented migrants or other unwanted individuals manage to leave Belarus. There is 
almost no cooperation, with a small exception of Chechen asylum seekers, who generally 
come to Poland through Belarus. 
When it comes to Russia, here the border, and thus visa issues are not a priority. Under the 
present governments, both Polish and Russian, the mutual dialog has been entangled into 
the matters of meat trade, gas and anti-missile shield, each of these point treated as a 
security issue. In consequence, such as energy security entered Polish discourse only last 
winter, during the Russian gas crisis. There is no collaboration between Polish and Russian 
border patrols and it is unlikely there ever will be. 
Apart from the on-the-grounds cooperation, Poland participates in the EU- and US-driven 
programs. They are mostly concerned with the remote control – against crime and terrorist 
threat. Using the platform of pre-Frontex focal points and the net of information exchange 
facilitated by the EU membership, Poland can participate in the pursuit of organized crime. 
As for the cooperation with the US, Poland participates in the passengers black list program. 
However, still the Schengen accession remains the main challenge for Polish government 
and institutions. It has been seriously delayed for the number of mainly technical reasons. On 
one hand, the modernization of the Sea and Land Border Direct Protection System required 
new bids (e.g. sea border protection) and infrastructure, which were delayed by the backlogs 
in the European Commission. The greatest delay was however caused by technical 
imperfections of the Transfer Agent, the national module of SIS II, with the problems 
concerning technical specifications.  
Poland has also problems concerning its own capacities. The sole modernization of the 
airports in order to get them be cable of serving cheap flights to UK and Ireland, both non-
Schengen countries to where most of the cheap flights and flights in general coming from 
Poland go, is likely to take more time than initially foreseen. 
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for Poland to Europeanize stronger in the next few years. The character of Europeanization 
in Poland until the date was top-down, meaning the presence of mediating agents (policy 
entrepreneurs), some kind of pro-European discourse used to promote policy change, and 
cooperation with the European counterparts, both vertically and horizontally. These elements 
have been largely missing from the scene after accession. 
First of all, the policy entrepreneurs have changed their attitudes. The legislative process on 
the EU level was lengthy, causing member states to final scapegoating, with Poland being an 
ideal candidate. This could have risen resentments on the domestic level. Since 2006, 
Poland has a clearly Eurosceptic, not to say, Europhobic government. For several months 
the new team did not participate in the crucial, for Poland, meetings of the Council’s Visa 
Workgroup or meetings concerning Schengen. The Polish ambassador to the EU was not 
appointed for months. The new civil servants who exchanged to a great extent the old, 
experienced batch have had little interest in the European issues, being constantly shaken 
by the domestic political storms. Poland has disappeared from the serious political debate on 
the EU level. It can be almost stated that after the accession Polish technocrats stopped 
even to learn things from their European counterparts, treating EU directives as a necessary 
evil, looking at the European transformation with repulsion and ignorance. 
The same can be said about the legitimizing discourse. For the time being, the argument 
Europeanization=Westernization=modernization has lost its grip in the present parliament. 
The national arguments are more priced. The amendment of immigration law in 2005 was 
still legitimized through the European lens, but since then the works have been very slow. 
Poland has become more interested in the nationally driven policies. We could even talk 
about Europeanization au revers, with Poland noticing suddenly that different member states 
have different migration policies and that they have not followed any European top-down 
pattern. The first sign of this might be the ad hoc seasonal workers program proposed by the 
government, which ignores all pre-Schengen regulations and agreements, and promises to 
go on AFTER the accession. 
Last, but not least – cooperation. As I have indicated above, cooperation between the states 
and with the EU have been weakened. Poland has the worst relations with Germany since 
1989, there is hardly any Western European state with which the cooperation would flourish 
(maybe the UK is an exception, because of the mass emigration of Poles). On the European 
level there is a new player Frontex, the agency based in Warsaw. Polish government and its 
bodies have little or no interest in it. The common attitude is that for the time being and in the 
shape it is, it is not really needed. It is mostly because Frontex has tried to coordinate 
multilateral joint actions that are already relatively easily organizable between the member 
states, on the basis of the existing agreements. On the other hand, its role in risk analysis 
exercise is perceived as important. Its main objectives as development of equipment, 
providing standards of trainings, technical progress monitoring, coordination of IT 
communication network and coordination of the deportation system are promising, but 
regarded as a far future. 
Thus, we can see that prospects of Europeanization of Polish border policy are rather bleak 
in the near future. The main three elements of the to-the-date Europeanization, i.e. the policy 
entrepreneurs, Europe-centered legitimizing discourse and pan-European cooperation, are 
largely missing, or they have lost their symbolic importance. The rising Polish nationalism is 
likely to produce Polish migration policy in the times, when all other member states are 
working on a common one. It is thus very likely that Polish border control and its access into 
Schengen will bring about minor, but nevertheless some, discrepancies with the EU-level 
provisions, only to accentuate the national touch. Maybe as a result we will witness bottom-
up Europeanization also on the Polish side. 
 
  134. Conclusions 
 
Polish visa policy has been developed under the direct influence of the supranational 
powers, both on the EU and wider, pan-European level. It was created in the process of 
policy transfer, learning and strategic socialization. Its development is characterized on one 
hand by the gradual flexibility of the policy concerning asylum and related concepts by 
introducing the higher European standards of protection, and by the gradual securitization of 
the policy as such. The visa policy is the only element of the policy versus foreigners that 
does not fall into the securitization scheme. It can be said that Europeanization of Polish 
policy towards foreigners was uneven: in some policy field deeper than the others, 
depending on the level of harmonization of the given policy on European level itself. 
Europeanization occurred by legitimizing discourse, crucial in the process of policy transfer.  
Following the Western European phenomenon, the policy versus immigrants in Poland has 
been securitized on the domestic level mainly in its “asylum” and its “third-country resident” 
dimension. Visa policy could not have been securitized for the general negative attitudes 
towards this idea – firstly, there was a popular disagreement on the second “iron curtain” 
cutting across strong business and family ties; secondly, Poles have to provide visas to some 
other countries of the world, and thus they feel strongly about the procedure. There has been 
a definite divergence between the security discourse and the actual implementation of the 
visa regime. Polish visa policy has been designed to keep up the volume of border crossings 
and to keep the mutual contacts on the both side of the border. As for now, this policy can be 
said to be a success. It can be said that because of it, there has been no decisive increase in 
the immigration flows to Poland through other legal channels, and most probably – also 
illegal. Of course, with the full implementation of Schengen Treaty, the situation could 
change drastically. The repercussions are hard to predict, but certainly, it will harm Polish 
neighborhood policy and most probably bring about much more illegal phenomena.  
The Europeanization of Polish border policy is rather unlikely in the near future. The three 
elements  sine qua non Europeanization in the pre-Enlargement Poland, i.e. the policy 
entrepreneurs, Europe-centered legitimizing discourse and pan-European cooperation, have 
been missing, due to the regime change or they have lost their symbolic importance. Poland 
has lost interest in Europeanization, as the official discourse has been slowly stopping 
identifying Europe with modernization. It can be argued that Polish border control and its 
access into Schengen will bring about minor, but nevertheless some, discrepancies with the 
EU-level provisions, only to accentuate the national touch. There is a danger of 
retrenchment, however, maybe as a result we will witness bottom-up Europeanization also 
on the Polish side. 
For the time being, we have to wait for the term of Polish Presidency to see some important 
developments. It is, for now, the only hope that Poland will go back on the Europeanizing 
path, and not only to the level of absorption. 
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